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ABSTRACT 
Matching survey data on Ph.D. scientists and engineers currently working in an R&D job 
in industry with their publications and patents, we study the relationship between their 
motives and their inventive performance. We find that individuals with a strong taste for 
science, i.e. motivated by intellectual challenge, independence, and contribution to 
society, create more novel and valuable patents. We find partial mediation of the effect of 
taste for science on value-weighted inventive output through academic boundary 
spanning, proxied by scientific publications co-authored with academic scientists. For 
novelty of inventive output, we find no mediation through academic boundary spanning. 
We confirm the negative relation between academic co-publications and annual base 
salary in industry. This helps to explain why individuals with a strong taste for salary 
collaborate less with academic scientists, negatively affecting their value-weighted 
inventive output.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For a long time, economists have studied technological change and economic growth as the outcome of 
firms’ economic incentives to invest in R&D (Nelson 1959). Given that individuals are the locus of 
inventions inside firms, surprisingly little research has looked at the motives of these individuals as a 
driver of innovation. The economics of science literature discusses what motivates individual scientists, 
stressing the importance of pecuniary motives of scientists, but also and perhaps more importantly their 
non-pecuniary motives (Dasgupta and David 1994, Stephan 2012). In particular, scientists are uniquely 
characterized by a taste for science – a desire for intellectual challenge (the puzzle joy), autonomy, and 
contribution to society through the diffusion of their acquired knowledge (Merton 1973, Pelz and 
Andrews 1976, Katz 2004).  
Using a large sample of U.S. Ph.D. scientists and engineers working in industry, Sauermann and 
Cohen (2010) were the first to study the relation between different types of motives and inventive 
performance. They found strong support for motives of individuals to matter for their inventive 
performance. They also explored the mechanisms driving the relation between motives and performance. 
As they did not find support for quantity of effort – number of hours worked – to be the reason why 
motives affect inventive performance, they looked into one aspect of the nature of effort: attendance of 
professional meetings, but also here did not find any support. They nevertheless called for future work to 
further examine the nature of the effort as mediator of the relationship between motives and inventive 
performance. 
In this paper, we follow Sauermann and Cohen (2010) by looking at the individual scientists and 
engineers within firms as the unit of analysis, their motives to explain their inventive performance, and 
the mediators that might explain this relationship. Among the set of motives, we are particularly 
interested in the non-pecuniary motives that taken together shape an individual’s “taste for science”. We 
further contribute to the literature by looking at the impact of motives not only on the pure amount of 
inventive output, but particularly on the nature of this output. In line with Amabile (2013), we 
characterize the inventive performance of individuals along two related dimensions: novelty and value. 
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We will test whether industrial scientists and engineers with a strong taste for science produce a more 
novel and/or more valuable inventive output. In addition, we test explicitly for mediation in the 
relationship between motives and the nature of inventive output. For mediating mechanisms, we look in 
line with the literature at both the quantity and nature of effort: we study the number of hours worked, the 
share of effort devoted to research, and involvement in academic boundary spanning activities. We argue 
that industrial scientists and engineers with a strong taste for science spend more time on early-stage 
research rather than late-stage development, and more actively interact with the broader scientific 
community, which we expect they can translate into more novel and/or valuable inventions (Stern 2004).  
To tackle these research questions, we use data on 464 Ph.D. holders in Science & Engineering 
working in an R&D job in industry at the end of 2005 from the Belgian wave of the OECD’s Careers of 
Doctorate Holders survey (2013). The survey provides information on the initial motives to choose for a 
Ph.D. and a career as scientist or engineer. We use explanatory factor analysis to derive two common 
factors – “taste for science” and “taste for salary & career”. The survey also provides information on job 
characteristics, such as number of hours worked, share of time spent on research, annual base salary, and 
name of the employer. We manually matched the survey information for these individuals to their patents 
and publications from secondary sources. We use the U.S. inventor database to trace all patents developed 
by these industrial scientists and engineers (Li et al. 2014). Beyond counting the number of patents, we 
calculate citation-weighted patent counts to measure the value of inventive output (Trajtenberg 1990). To 
measure the novelty of inventive output, we count the number of new to the patent corpus words found in 
the title, abstract, and claims of the patents (Arts and Fleming 2015). The Web of Science database allows 
us to collect the scientific publications of these individuals, including those co-authored with academic 
scientists, which we use to proxy for academic boundary spanning involvement (e.g., Cockburn and 
Henderson 1998, Zucker et al. 2002, Liu and Stuart 2010). At the same time, the matching with patent 
and publication data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity among individuals using pre-
sample – before their current job – measures of inventive and scientific performance and to control for the 
scientific and inventive capacity of the employing firms.  
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We find that a stronger “taste for science” relates to a more novel and a higher citation weighted 
inventive output, while a stronger “taste for salary & career” relates to a lower citation weighted inventive 
output. Looking at potential mediators, we find that those with a stronger taste for science do not work 
more hours a week. But they spend more of their time on research and they co-publish more with 
academic scientists. The extent to which they collaborate with academic scientists is associated with a 
more novel and a higher citation weighted inventive output. Academic boundary spanning partially 
mediates the relation between taste for science and citation weighted inventive output, but surprisingly 
boundary spanning does not mediate the relation between taste for science and novelty of output. Despite 
the positive link between academic boundary spanning and the nature of inventive output, the data also 
confirm the negative relation between co-publishing with academics and annual base salary in industry, as 
found by Stern (2004). Consistent with this penalty in salary, those individuals with a strong “taste for 
salary & career” are less involved in academic boundary spanning. Missing this “entry ticket” to the 
academic community significantly reduces their ability to create valuable inventions.  
Our research contributes to the literature examining the relation between the motives of industrial 
scientists and engineers and the innovation performance of firms, by providing complementary evidence 
on how and why “taste for science” and “taste for salary & career” relate not only to the quantity but also 
the nature of individuals’ inventive output (e.g., Sauermann and Cohen 2010, Lacetera and Zirulia 2012). 
Through our analysis on how academic boundary spanning may act as mediator between taste for science 
and the nature of inventive output, we also contribute to the literature studying the micro foundations of 
how scientific research in academia translates into technological innovation in industry (e.g., Allen and 
Cohen 1969, Fleming and Sorenson 2004, Liu and Stuart 2010). Finally, our results are also informative 
for the literature that looks at how to attract and accommodate scientists in industry (e.g., Vallas and 
Kleinman 2008).  
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2. INDIVIDUALS’ MOTIVES AND INVENTIVE PERFORMANCE  
We first review the literature on the motives of scientists and engineers, their link to inventive 
performance, and the possible mediating channels through which this link is established. We close this 
section by describing how we will contribute to the literature, specifying our research strategy.  
2.1. Motives of scientists and engineers  
Research and development in industry is primarily focused on specific commercial applications and 
largely driven by firms’ economic incentives (Nelson 1959). Firms are typically viewed as lacking the 
incentives to invest in basic research projects which are characterized by high uncertainty about the 
eventual appropriable economic payoffs (Aghion et al. 2008). By outsourcing more basic research 
projects to academia, firms provide a credible commitment not to abort or redirect projects with less 
certain economic returns (Lacetera 2009). In academia, scientists have a strong taste for science, i.e. 
conduct science because of the intellectual challenge (Merton 1973, Dasgupta and David 1994, Stephan 
1996). Academic scientists have the freedom to conduct research projects which they find intellectually 
challenging, at the frontier of knowledge, even in case there is no immediate economic return (Dasgupta 
and David 1994). In contrast to academia, firms can direct their scientists and engineers to work on those 
R&D projects with high perceived appropriable economic value (Aghion et al. 2008). To this end, they 
can use controls and monetary incentives. Yet, firms’ ability to use standard bureaucratic controls and 
monetary incentives to direct scientists and engineers’ performance through effort is limited. Bureaucratic 
controls are costly to implement and run counter to a creative environment conducive to inventive 
outcomes. Designing proper incentive schemes to stir inventive performance is challenging for firms. 
Because of the inherent uncertainty characterizing R&D projects and the uncertainty about their eventual 
commercial success, it is difficult for firms to link incentives to performance (Prendergast 1999). 
Moreover, monetary returns may not be the most powerful incentives, requiring industrial scientists and 
engineers to have strong pecuniary motives. Therefore, understanding what motivates industrial scientists 
and engineers is important for understanding technological progress and innovation in industry. 
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Prior studies confirm that individuals with a strong taste for science prefer a job in academia over 
industry, while those with a strong taste for salary prefer a job in industry (Roach and Sauermann 2010, 
Agarwal and Ohyama 2012). More recent empirical evidence suggests that there is still a large 
heterogeneity in tastes among industrial scientists and engineers (Agarwal and Ohyama 2012, Sauermann 
and Roach 2010). Some individuals working in industry might have a strong taste for science and a weak 
taste for salary. This is witnessed by industrial scientists and engineers who are willing to trade off salary 
in return for the freedom to participate in science, i.e. to interact with the academic community and 
publish (Stern 2004).  
2.2. Motives of industrial scientists and engineers and their inventive performance  
If there is heterogeneity in motives among industrial scientists and engineers, this might relate to 
differences in their inventive performance. This link between motives and inventive performance at the 
individual level has seldom been looked at in corporate innovation studies. In one of the few studies, 
Sauermann and Cohen (2010) show, for a sample of Ph.D. scientists and engineers working in U.S. 
industry, how different motives relate to heterogeneity in patenting. They find that individuals with a 
preference for intellectual challenge, salary, and independence create more patents, while those motivated 
by job security and responsibility create less patents.  
2.3. Mediation via Quantity and Nature of Effort  
Motives matter for inventive performance because they affect effort. The willingness of a scientist or 
engineer to supply creative effort depends on what motivates him/her to do so. Prior research suggests 
that motives can affect performance either through the quantity of effort or through the nature of effort 
(Lacetera and Zirulia 2012, Sauermann and Cohen 2010).  
(i) Mediation via quantity of effort 
Different motives might relate to differences in the quantity of effort exerted and – as a result – increase 
or decrease the inventive performance of the individual (Lazear 1997). Industrial scientists and engineers 
motivated by intellectual challenge and independence might spend more time at work when firms offer 
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them more discretion in choosing R&D projects which they find intellectually inspiring (Lacetera 2009). 
Individuals motivated by salary or career advancement might work more if it enables them to earn a 
higher salary or climb the corporate ladder. The empirical evidence is however not supportive of 
mediation via quantity of effort. Sauermann and Cohen (2010) find no evidence for quantity of effort to 
mediate the relation between any of the motives they consider and inventive performance. 
(ii) Mediation via nature of effort 
Motives might relate to heterogeneity in performance through differences in the nature of effort. 
Conditional on a given number of hours worked, industrial scientists and engineers might allocate their 
time to different input activities which affect differently their inventive output. First, individuals with a 
strong taste for science might spend more time on upstream research rather than on downstream 
development or other tasks such as management (Roach and Sauermann 2010, Agarwal and Ohyama 
2012). Second, a taste for science may impact inventive performance because it triggers industrial 
scientists and engineers to participate in science and connect to the broader scientific community, giving 
them privileged access to external knowledge which they can use for technological innovation (Allen and 
Cohen 1969, Tushman 1977, Tushman and Scanlan 1981, Stern 2004). Mediation through engagement in 
research and academic boundary spanning remains empirically unexplored. Sauermann and Cohen (2010) 
only considered whether individuals attended professional meetings, an imperfect proxy for the nature of 
effort reflecting interactions with the broader scientific community. They did not find support for 
attendance of professional meetings to mediate the effect of any of the motives on inventive performance.  
Overall, the discussion of the literature and the existing evidence confirm that a better 
understanding of what is driving the observed relation between motives of industrial scientists and 
engineers and their inventive output is important for understanding firms’ capacity to innovate. While the 
evidence strongly supports the importance of individual motives for inventive performance, it remains 
unclear why motives matter for inventive performance. Which are the mechanisms that mediate the 
relation between motives and performance? Is it because motives shape what individuals will spend their 
time and energy on, that it shapes their inventive performance? Finally, what remains unexplored is how 
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motives affect not just the quantity of inventive output but also the nature of this output. We aim to 
address these gaps in the literature. 
2.4. Our research: Taste for science, academic boundary spanning and the novelty and value of 
inventive output 
We explore the relation between the motives of industrial scientists and engineers and the nature of their 
inventive output, and the possible mechanisms underlying the observed relation between motives and 
performance. We exploit the correlation among different motives to look for sets of motives which may 
jointly shape a “taste for science” versus a “taste for salary & career”. Rather than looking at the 
quantity of inventive output of industrial scientists and engineers, we look at how motives shape the 
nature of inventive output, distinguishing the novelty of inventive output from its eventual impact or 
value (Amabile 2013).  
We are particularly interested in understanding why taste for science matters for the nature of 
inventive output, i.e. which are the intermediary mechanisms driving the observed relationship between 
“taste for science” and inventive performance. To this end, we look, in line with the literature, not only at 
the quantity of effort, i.e. number of hours worked, but also at the nature of effort exerted.  
As we are focusing on the impact of “taste for science” on the novelty and value of inventive 
output, we will look at how much effort is spent on research as a mediator. Individuals with a taste for 
science might spend more time on upstream research rather than on downstream development, or other 
tasks, such as management. Because they spend more time on research, they generate more inventions 
that are also expected to be more novel. Upstream research projects are arguably more intellectually 
challenging, have more scope for independent thinking, push the frontiers of knowledge into new and 
unexplored territories, and therefore result in a more novel inventive output. Downstream development 
projects are more likely to be routinized, structured and target incremental improvements. Inventions 
originating from upstream research are also expected to have a bigger impact and to be more valuable 
compared to more incremental inventions, as they are more likely to become breakthrough inventions on 
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which follow-up inventions build (Verhoeven et al. 2016). Nevertheless, upstream research projects are 
also characterized by higher degrees of experimentation and carry a higher uncertainty about eventual 
value (Aghion et al 2008). Because such exploratory projects typically carry more risks and uncertain 
outcomes, having a higher variability in success, the potential for more novel and breakthrough inventions 
might simultaneously be associated with a higher probability of failure and an – on average – less 
valuable inventive output (Arts and Fleming 2015).  
Besides spending more time on research, we argue that taste for science influences inventive 
performance because it triggers industrial scientists and engineers to spend more effort interacting with 
the broader academic community (Tushman 1977, Tushman and Scanlan 1981). Academic boundary 
spanning is important for inventive performance as it allows individuals to source external knowledge 
developed in academe, which can enhance the effectiveness of downstream R&D (Allen and Cohen 1969, 
Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Liu and Stuart 2010). New academic knowledge is difficult to access and 
absorb, often requiring hands-on involvement through close interaction with academic scientists (Jensen 
and Thursby 2001, Zucker et al. 2002). By collaborating with academics at the lab bench, industrial 
scientists and engineers obtain early and privileged access to novel scientific insights, resulting in a more 
novel inventive output compared to colleagues who do not span the boundary between industry and 
academia (Cassiman et al. 2012). The resulting inventions might also have a bigger impact and be more 
valuable. Alternatively, academic boundary spanning might result in a less valuable inventive output 
because of the higher uncertainty and risk of failure associated with early-stage boundary-spanning 
research.  
3. DATA AND METHODS 
3.1. Sample and Data Collection 
The main data source for this paper is the Belgian edition of the Careers of Doctorate Holders survey. 
Created by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Eurostat, and the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Institute for Statistics, the 
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survey aims to gain a better insight into the career trajectories of individuals with a Ph.D. degree.1 The 
survey is the starting point for the present analysis as it contains information on individuals’ initial 
motives to choose for a Ph.D. and career as scientist or engineer. In addition, the survey includes detailed 
information on the job of the Ph.D. holders. The survey was launched in 2006, addressed the full 
population of Ph.D. holders in Belgium, and the response rate of the survey was 20% (Moortgat and Van 
Mellaert 2011).  
In this paper, we use a subsample of 464 industrial scientists and engineers who formerly 
obtained a Ph.D. in natural sciences, (bio)medical sciences, engineering and technology, or agricultural 
sciences (we disregard Ph.D. holders in the social sciences or humanities), who are full-time employed as 
R&D scientist or engineer in industry at the end of 2005, who answered the relevant survey questions 
and, who left their name and contact details. This information allowed us to hand-collect for each 
individual patents and publications from secondary sources. To collect publication data, we used the Web 
of Science database. To collect patent data, we first used the U.S. inventor database to match each 
individual to a unique inventor if any (Li et al., 2014)2. Second, we used the EPO Worldwide Patent 
Statistical Database (PATSTAT) to collect patent-family corrected citation data3. We use objective 
information from secondary sources to measure inventive performance and the involvement in academic 
boundary spanning activities, rather than self-reported information from the survey, as in Sauermann and 
Cohen (2010). This reduces the likelihood of common method and social desirability bias. The 
disadvantage is that we can only do this for the subset of individuals who left their name and contact 
details, which reduces the effective sample size.  
3.2. Measures 
                                                          
1 See Eurostat (2012) or OECD (2012) for more information on the survey. Moortgat and Van Mellaert (2011) 
discuss the Belgian data collection, and Auriol et al. (2012) provides an overview of the survey methodology. 
2As we are only looking at USPTO patents, this provides a (quality) selection in our Belgian sample, excluding local 
and European patents. For the latter, we miss the inventor disambiguation.  
3 By using PATSTAT for citations, we make sure to collect all forward citations for all patent families which 
include at least one USPTO patent application assigned to a scientist included in our sample. As such, we account 
for citations received by a different patent from the same family and for citations received from non-U.S. patents.  
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(i) Outcome variables.  
To measure the nature of inventive output of industrial scientists and engineers, we look at whether the 
patents created during their job are novel and whether these patents are valuable.  
 Citation-weighted patents. To measure the value of inventive output, we calculate the number of 
citation-weighted patents (Trajtenberg 1990). We take into account all patents filed between the starting 
date of the job, which is asked in the survey, and January 1 2006, the reference date of the survey. 
Citations refer to how often the patent served as prior art for subsequent patents, which correlates with the 
technological impact as well as with the economic value of the invention (Harhoff et al. 1999, 
Gambardella et al. 2008)4.  
New words. To measure the novelty of inventive output, we use the measure developed in Arts 
and Fleming (2015), counting the number of unique words in the patents which appear for the first time in 
the full patent corpus. To calculate the measure, all words in the title, abstract, and claims, are tokenized 
for all U.S. patents back to 1975. Numbers and hyphened words were removed, and all patents before 
1980 are used to establish a baseline5.  
(ii) Independent variables related to motives. 
Individuals’ motives are captured in the survey question “Why did you choose a career in research?”. 
This is asked in the survey right after questions on education and before any questions on their job, which 
appear at the end of the survey. The question explicitly captures initial motives and not current 
preferences. Respondents could indicate any number of motives from a list. In line with prior research, we 
apply exploratory factor analysis to examine the relation among different motives (Sauermann and Roach 
2012). In the factor analysis, we retain the full sample of scientists and engineers currently employed in 
                                                          
4 Our main findings are robust to using alternative measures for the value of inventive output: number of claims 
across all patents or number of times renewal fees are paid. Results not reported.  
5 Our main findings are robust to using alternative measures for the novelty of inventive output: number of new 
subclass combinations across all patents and number of patents with new technological origins (Arts and Veugelers 
2015, Verhoeven et al. 2016). Results not reported. 
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academia or industry (n=1,114)6. Table 1 shows the results of the factor analysis. Both the screeplot and 
the Kaiser criterion suggest the existence of two latent variables, which jointly explain 87% of the 
variance in motives.  
Insert Table 1 here 
Taste for salary & career. The first latent variable correlates with motives for salary, extralegal 
benefits, and – to a smaller extent – career advancement and job security. Taste for science. The second 
latent variable is labelled taste for science as it strongly correlates with motives for intellectual challenge, 
independence, and – to a smaller extent – contribution to society. These non-pecuniary motives are 
typically associated with the institution of science (e.g., Merton 1973, Stephan 2012). Taste for science 
and taste for salary & career are calculated using the regression scoring method and afterwards 
normalized for ease of interpretability. 
As expected, we find that individuals with a low taste for science or a high taste for salary & 
career are more likely to select into industry, while those with a high taste for science or a low taste for 
salary & career are more likely to become academic scientists (see also Roach and Sauermann (2010) for 
similar results7). Nevertheless, there is still a large heterogeneity in tastes among industrial scientists and 
engineers.  
(iii) Mediating variables. 
To study through which mediating channels motives impact inventive performance, we will look at both 
the quantity of effort and the nature of the effort, particularly the extent of involvement in research and 
boundary spanning activities. Hours worked. Respondents report how many hours they work an average 
on a weekly basis, measuring the quantity of effort. Research. Self-reported share of time spent on 
performing, guiding, or interpreting research in their current job. Co-publications. We calculate for each 
                                                          
6 Our main findings are robust to using only the sample of industrial scientists and engineers in the factor analysis. 
7 We find significant differences in taste for science (TFS) and taste for salary & career (TFC) between individuals 
working in industry versus individuals in academia: T-test for TFS: t= -10.9055, Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000. T-test TFC: 
t= 4.2777, Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000). Also in regression analysis, correcting for other controls, Ph.D. holders with a high 
TFS are more likely to select into academe rather than industry and vice versa for TFC (results not reported). 
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individual the number of Web of Science (WOS) publications co-authored with academic scientists 
between the starting date of the current job and January 1 20068. Co-publications with academic scientists 
have been used by prior firm-level research to measure academic boundary spanning (Cockburn and 
Henderson 1998, Zucker et al. 2002, Gittelman and Kogut 2003). It is a much more hands-on and active 
form of interaction with the academic community than reading scientific publications or attending 
professional meetings. It also provides more variation than a simple yes or no classification into boundary 
spanning activities.  
(iv) Control variables. 
First, it is important to control for the skills of the individuals reflecting both their ability and experience. 
We will look at two dimensions of skills: technological and scientific. Individuals with higher 
technological skills might be eager to work more hours or spend more time on research because of the 
higher expected success. Effort invokes less disutility on them. Moreover, companies might assign their 
best people to the most promising R&D projects. Likewise, the returns from engaging in basic research 
projects and participating in the academic community will be higher for individuals with stronger 
scientific skills (Dasgupta and David 1994). Scientifically skilled people might have better access to the 
academic community, can better and more quickly absorb novel scientific discoveries and realize their 
commercial potential (Hicks 1995, Stern 2004)9. Moreover, companies might allow or even stimulate 
their more scientifically skilled R&D employees to work on research rather than development projects 
and to collaborate with academic scientists. As such, the estimated effect of both taste for science, share 
of time spent on research, and co-publications might suffer from an upward skill bias. To control for this 
potential bias, we include for each individual a number of pre-sample skill controls.  
                                                          
8 The large majority (85%) of WOS publications by industrial scientists and engineers are co-authored with 
academic scientists. Findings are robust to using the total number of WOS publications (results not reported). We 
believe co-publications with academic scientists provide a cleaner measure for academic boundary spanning. 
9 We find support for the assumption that individuals with a higher ability, as measured by the number of pre sample 
publications, have better access to the academic community while being employed in industry. The number of pre-
sample scientific publications is found to positively affect the number of publications co-authored with academic 
scientists while being employed in industry. These findings illustrate how not controlling for the ability of 
individuals might inflate the findings with respect to the effect of academic boundary spanning on performance. 
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Pre sample patents: we include the number of citation-weighted patents filed before the current 
job. As such, we include the pre-sample value of the outcome variable as a control for unobserved 
individual-specific heterogeneity (e.g., Blundell et al. 1999). Pre sample publications and pre sample 
publication citations: we also include the number of publications published before the current job and the 
average number of citations received by these publications within three years. In addition, we also include 
Ph.D. scholarship: a binary measure indicating whether their Ph.D. was funded by a government or 
private scholarship, which select on prior academic achievement, perceived ability, and a promising Ph.D. 
proposal; Time to Ph.D.: the time needed to complete their Ph.D. relative to peers within the same field; 
Ph.D. abroad: a binary measure indicating whether the individual obtained a Ph.D. abroad. Virtually all 
individuals in our sample who obtained a Ph.D. abroad studied at a university which is higher ranked than 
any Belgian university.  
Besides controlling for skills, we include a number of additional individual-level control 
variables. Job tenure: the number of years the person has been in their job at the end of 2005; Job 
tenure>10: we include a binary measure equal to one when job tenure is longer than10 years to control 
for the fact that publication data is only available from 1996 onwards. Hence, for individuals working in 
the same job for more than 10 years, we capture only those publications of the last 10 years; Age: the age 
of the person at the end of 2005. Tenure and age also correct for the longer time window for older tenured 
people when counting citations; Female: a binary measure equal to one for females; Belgian: a binary 
measure indicating whether the individual has the Belgian nationality; Married: a binary measure 
indicating whether the person is married or officially cohabiting; Children: number of children.  
We also include indicators for whether the person obtained a Ph.D. in natural science, a Ph.D. in 
agricultural sciences, a Ph.D. in medical sciences, or a Ph.D. in engineering and technology, as there 
could be field specific fixed effects in the relationship between motives and inventive performance: 
mostly notably specific profiles for engineers and/or for medical degrees.  
Finally, we include a number of firm-level controls. The inventive performance of industrial 
scientists and engineers might not only be driven by the characteristics of the individuals, but also by the 
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characteristics of the firm employing them. Most important for our study, firms can differ in inventive 
performance and scientific orientation, as reflected in the extent to which they patent, and in the extent to 
which they allow or incentivize employees to collaborate with academic scientists and publish in 
scientific journals. Firm patents: the number of granted patents filed by the firm between the beginning of 
2003 until the end of 2005; Firm co-publications: the number of publications co-authored by the firm’s 
employees and academic scientists between the beginning of 2003 until the end of 200510. A small 
number of individuals did not fill in the name of the firm they work for. For this set of individuals, firm 
patents and co-publications is set at zero, and the binary indicator Firm name missing is set at one. Table 
2 provides summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. Table A.4 in appendix show a 
correlation matrix.  
Insert Table 2 here 
The summary statistics in Table 2 illustrate the high variance in motives among the industrial 
scientists and engineers. At the same time, it illustrates the large skew in inventive performance. There 
are also large differences between scientists and engineers in the number of co-publications.  
3.3. Social Desirability and Common Method Bias 
The use of survey data can introduce two common types of bias. First, a social desirability bias might 
cause individuals to list those motives which they believe to be socially desirable (Moorman and 
Podsakoff 1992). This introduces a bias in case it affects the relationship between motives, mediators, and 
inventive performance. This type of bias is unlikely in our case because the measures for academic 
boundary-spanning and inventive performance are collected from other sources than the survey. 
Moreover, the survey question on motives is proximally separated from questions on the job and 
employer, which appear at the end of the survey. Therefore, it seems unlikely that respondents changed 
                                                          
10 Although not all firms have patents and co-publications in the observation window, our results are robust for the 
subsample of individuals working in firms with at least one patent, for the subsample of individuals working in firms 
with at least one co-publication, and for the subsample of individuals working in firms with at least one patent and at 
least one co-publication. 
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their motives to provide a desirable explanation for their performance or collaboration with academic 
scientists. A second type of bias might result from using a common method to measure outcome, 
mediator and explanatory variables (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Our analysis is unlikely to suffer from 
common method bias because information on motives, boundary spanning, and inventive performance are 
collected from three separate sources. 
3.4. Specification and Estimation Method 
We are interested in the relationship between motives and the nature of the inventive output 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (citation 
weighted patents and new words) created by individual i since the beginning of his/her current job in firm 
f until the end of 2005. (1) 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(∝ + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽2 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 & 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 +  𝛾𝛾 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖+ 𝛿𝛿 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
Given that our outcome variables are non-negative integers, we estimate the regressions using 
Poisson quasi maximum likelihood (PQML) and report robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
PQML renders consistent estimates under correct mean specification and is robust to a large number of 
zero’s and to overdispersion of the dependent variable (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon 1984; Silva 
and Tenreyro 2006). We account for differences in job tenure at the end of 2005 by estimating the models 
with exposure, i.e. by including the log of job tenure as a control variable with the coefficient constrained 
to one (Long and Freese 2005).  
We explicitly test for mediation of the effects of taste for science and taste for salary & career on 
inventive output through hours worked, time spent on research, and academic boundary spanning 
measured through co-publications. To this end, we use the procedure of Baron and Kenny (1986). First, 
we predict the main, reduced form, effects of tastes on inventive performance, corresponding with model 
(1) above. Second, we predict the effects of tastes for science and taste for salary & career on the potential 
mediators. Third, we re-estimate model (1) but include the mediator variables, corresponding with model 
(2) below. 
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(2) 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓(∝ +𝛽𝛽1 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 𝑖𝑖+𝛽𝛽2 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 & 𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3 𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓 − 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽4 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽5 ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑤𝑤𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� 
To test for mediation, we check whether the coefficients of taste for science and taste for salary & 
career in (2) are smaller compared to the coefficients in (1) using seemingly unrelated estimation (suest 
command in Stata). In addition, we use nonparametric bootstrapping with 5,000 replications to test the 
robustness of these mediation results and calculate the direct, indirect, and total effects of taste for science 
and taste for salary & career on inventive performance, as well as the bias-corrected confidence intervals 
around these effects (Preacher and Hayes 2008). Because we have multiple mediators and outcome 
variables measured in counts, we use generalized structural equation models to calculate the effects (gsem 
command in Stata). 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive Results 
Table 3 illustrates our main research questions with descriptive statistics. Individuals with a strong taste 
for science (i.e. above the median sample value) not only create more patents, but differentiate themselves 
even more on citation weighted patents and new words (all differences are statistically significant). Their 
higher inventive output does not correlate with a higher input as they do not work more hours. But, they 
spend a larger share of their time on research and are also more involved in academic boundary spanning, 
publishing more in collaboration with academic scientists. The latter difference is however not 
statistically significant.  
Boundary spanning, as witnessed through co-publications with academic scientists, matters for 
the quantity, value, and novelty of inventive output. Those scientists and engineers who score above the 
sample median on co-publishing display a higher inventive performance, not only in terms of quantity of 
patents, but also and even more outspokenly on citation weighted patents and new words, although the 
latter is only significant at the 10% level. Individuals spending a large share of their time on research are 
also more productive, but none of these effects are statistically significant. Finally, individuals who work 
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more hours create not only more patents, but also score higher on citation weighted patents and new 
words, but the effect on new words is not statistically significant.  
Insert Table 3 here 
4.2. Regression Analysis  
(i) Taste for science, taste for salary & career, and inventive performance. 
The analyses reported in Table 4, corresponding with model (1), confirm that scientists and engineers 
with a stronger taste for science have a significantly higher citation-weighted and a more novel inventive 
output. The differences are sizeable: a one standard deviation higher score on taste for science implies a 
82% higher citation-weighted patent count and a 102% higher new word count. Not surprisingly, taste for 
science has a stronger effect on novel output than on citation weighted output. Once controlled for the 
taste for science, those with a stronger taste for salary & career display a lower citation weighted output 
as well as a lower novel output, but only the first effect is significant at the 10% level. A one standard 
deviation higher score on taste for salary & career is associated with a 32% lower citation-weighted patent 
count. In contrast to Sauermann and Cohen (2010), who found a positive relation between motives for 
salary and number of patents, we find a negative relation between taste for salary & career and citation-
weighted patents11. In the mediation analysis below, we explore potential explanations for these findings. 
Insert Table 4 here 
(ii) Hours worked, time spent on research, and academic boundary spanning as mediators. 
As a first step to understand the mechanisms mediating the relationship between motives and inventive 
performance, we test whether taste for science and taste for salary & career significantly affect our three 
potential mediators: hours worked, self-reported share of time spent on research, and boundary spanning 
activities proxied by academic co-publications. Table 5 shows that individuals with a high taste for 
science do not spent significantly more hours working. But they do spend a significantly larger share of 
                                                          
11 When regressing the number of patents, we also find a significant negative effect associated with “taste for salary 
& career”, see Table A.3.  
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their time on research and are significantly more engaged in academic boundary spanning. A one standard 
deviation higher score on taste for science implies 22% more time spent on research and a 34% higher co-
publication count. Taste for salary & career, while having no significant effect on hours worked nor on 
time spent on research, is significantly negatively related to academic boundary spanning activities. A one 
standard deviation higher score on taste for salary & career is associated with 28% fewer co-publications 
with academic scientists.  
To further explore why those with a high taste for salary & career are less likely to be engaged in 
co-publishing with academics, we analyze in Table A.1 in appendix the relationship between salary and 
co-publications. In line with the finding of Stern (2004) that people working in industry pay to be 
scientists, we confirm a significant negative relationship between co-publications and annual base salary, 
controlling for scientific ability. Hence, industrial scientists and engineers need to trade off co-publishing 
with academic scientists against a higher salary12. This finding correlates with why individuals with a 
high taste for salary shy away from academic boundary spanning, as they care more about the associated 
wage loss.  
Insert Table 5 here 
The second step in the mediation analysis is to establish that the mediator variables significantly 
affect inventive performance while controlling for taste for science and taste for salary & career (Baron 
and Kenny 1986). As shown in columns 2-4 in Table 6, a standard deviation increase in hours worked, 
share of time spent on research and co-publications, implies a 32%, 36% and 25% increase in citation-
weighted patents respectively13. If we include the three mediators together (column 5), only co-
                                                          
12 Marginal effects indicate that a standard deviation increase in co-publications implies a 3% lower annual base 
salary. The person with the highest number of co-publications in our sample (75) has a 35% lower salary compared 
to a scientist with zero co-publications. 
13 Scientists with the largest number of co-publications have a 1,181% higher citation-weighted patent count 
compared to scientists with zero co-publications. Spending 100% of time at work on research implies a 200% 
increase in citation-weighted patents compared to spending 100% of time on development or other tasks. Scientists 
with the largest number of hours worked have a 335% higher citation-weighted patent count compared to scientists 
with the lowest number of hours worked. 
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publications remains a highly significant predictor of citation weighted inventive output. As shown in 
columns 7-10 of Table 6, co-publications and hours worked significantly affect the number of new words 
while time spent on research surprisingly has no effect. A standard deviation increase in hours worked 
and co-publications implies a 33% and 20% increase in new words respectively14. In line with the 
findings for citation-weighted patents, only co-publications remains significant if we jointly include the 
three mediators (column 10). Together, these results confirm the positive effect of quantity of effort on 
inventive performance, like in Sauermann and Cohen (2010). But the nature of this effort seems to matter 
even more for performance, particularly academic boundary spanning as proxied by co-publications, and 
particularly for citation weighted patents. 
Insert Table 6 here 
The third and final step of the mediation analysis is to check whether the effects of taste for 
science and taste for salary & career on performance decrease with inclusion of the mediators. As 
illustrated in columns 1-5 of Table 6, the effect of taste for science on citation-weighted patents decreases 
significantly after including the mediators15. Especially the inclusion of co-publications and to a smaller 
extent share of time spent on research reduce the effect of taste for science. Including the three mediators, 
the coefficient of taste for science drops from 0.61 to 0.38. A one standard deviation higher score on taste 
for science implies a 43% higher citation-weighted patent count compared to a 82% higher citation 
weighted patent count in the model excluding the three mediators. Although we find significant support 
for mediation through the nature of effort, the mediation is only partial as the effect of taste for science 
remains significant after inclusion of our mediators.  
                                                          
14 Scientists with the largest number of co-publications have a 717% higher new word count compared to scientists 
with zero co-publications. The difference in new words between scientists with the largest number of hours worked 
and those with the lowest number is 354%. 
15 We perform a Wald test to compare the coefficients between the different models using seemingly unrelated 
estimation (suest in Stata 14). Coefficient taste for science in column (1) versus (5): chi2(1)= 2.76; p-value of one 
sided test = 0.0484. 
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In contrast, the negative effect of taste for salary & career on citation-weighted patents, albeit 
marginally significant, is fully mediated by academic boundary spanning 16. The large negative coefficient 
of taste for salary, significant at the 10% level (column 1), becomes much smaller and insignificant after 
including co-publications. This finding suggests that those with a comparable taste for science but a 
stronger taste for salary & career perform worse in generating citation-weighted patents because they 
engage less in bench-level collaboration with academic scientists. Once controlled for their lesser 
involvement in academic boundary spanning, those with a strong taste for salary & career are no longer 
significantly underperforming.  
For novelty of inventive output, we do not find significant support for mediation of the effect of 
taste for science through the three channels considered. The positive effect of taste for science on novelty 
is reduced somewhat after including the mediators, particularly academic boundary spanning, but not 
significantly. Although academic boundary spanning does lead to a more novel inventive output, and 
individuals with a high taste for science do engage more in academic boundary spanning, this seems 
surprisingly not to be the major factor behind why taste for science leads to more novel inventive output. 
This suggests that taste for science has mostly a pure innate effect on novelty not mediated by the quantity 
and nature of effort. Or there might be other mediators not yet controlled for which can explain the 
relationship between taste for science and novelty of inventive output. 
To test the robustness of the mediation results, we use nonparametric bootstrapping with 5,000 
replications and a generalized structured equation model to calculate the direct, indirect, and total effects 
of taste for science and taste for salary & career on inventive performance (Preacher and Hayes 2008). 
We restrict the analysis to citation-weighted patents as outcome because we did not find support for 
mediation in the regressions with new words as outcome. Overall, the results are in line with our previous 
findings. As illustrated in Table 7, the total effect of taste for science on citation-weighted patent output is 
significant. This total effect is first and foremost composed of a significant positive direct effect. But taste 
                                                          
16 Coefficient taste for salary in column (1) versus (5): chi2(1)= 2.88; p-value of one sided test = 0.0447. 
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for science also has a significant positive indirect effect on citation-weighted patents through its 
stimulating effect on academic boundary spanning, itself a significant driver of value weighted inventive 
output. The total indirect effect via co-publications is significantly positive17. The bootstrapping therefore 
confirms the robustness of the direct effect of “taste for science” on citation-weighted patent output and 
the positive indirect effect through academic boundary spanning. As the indirect effect is much smaller, it 
also confirms that mediation through the three channels identified is only partial. The total effect of taste 
for salary & career on citation-weighted patents is negative but not significant at the 5% level18. While 
the direct effect is negative and constitutes the largest component of the total negative effect, it is however 
not significant. The indirect effect through academic boundary spanning is however significantly 
negative. Individuals with a strong taste for salary & career have a lower citation-weighted patent output 
because they are less involved in academic boundary spanning, but this effect is only a small component 
of the total effect of taste for salary & career on performance.  
Insert Table 7 here 
It is particularly important to control for skills and other unobserved heterogeneity among 
individuals captured by our pre-sample measures of inventive and scientific performance. Individuals 
with a higher pre-sample citation-weighted patent count, whose Ph.D. was funded by a scholarship, or 
who finished their Ph.D. in a relatively short period of time, perform better in their current job in industry 
(Table 4). Controlling for pre-sample scientific publications is important because those with a stronger 
pre-sample scientific track record are more likely to collaborate with academic scientists in their current 
job in industry (see columns 1-3 of Table 5).  
4.3. Socialization of Motives and Endogeneity  
                                                          
17 While the indirect effect of taste for science via time spent on research is not significant at the 5% level, the total 
indirect effect via co-publications and time spent on research is significant and larger than the indirect effect via co-
publications only. 
18 Also in the results reported supra in Table 4, the negative effect of taste for salary & career on citation-weighted 
patent count was only significant at the 10% level. 
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A main concern is that motives, and taste for science in particular, change because of socialization in the 
type of job and firm, or because of a change in inventive performance (Gundry 1993). Individuals with 
more science-related job activities, working for science-oriented firms, or with a more successful track 
record of scientific or inventive performance might indicate to have (acquired) a stronger taste for 
science. This might bias the effect of the reported taste for science on co-publications and on inventive 
performance. The literature typically treats motives related to job attributes as pre-determined, 
exogenously given and stable over time (e.g., Amabile et al. 1994). This is confirmed by empirical 
evidence tracing the same industrial scientists and engineers at different points in time, showing how 
motives related to intellectual challenge and independence – the key components of taste for science, are 
very stable over time and not affected by changes in inventive performance of the individual (Sauermann 
and Cohen 2010, p. 2142).  
As already discussed supra, our survey data aim to measure taste for science at the start of the 
career, not at the current juncture. Nonetheless, we check for a potential change in motives due to 
socialization in the type of firm or due to inventive performance. We do this in several ways. First, we 
include different pre-sample measures of inventive performance, both at the level of the individual as well 
as at the firm level. This allows to control for a change in motives due to a higher or lower inventive 
performance. Overall, as the reported results hold including these controls, we conclude that a change in 
taste for science due to a high or low inventive or scientific performance or selection into a high or low 
inventive or scientific firm environment, is unlikely to drive the observed relationship between taste for 
science, academic boundary spanning, and inventive performance.  
Second, we replicate the analysis using firm fixed effects, which account for any unobserved 
firm-level factors causing motives to change. Unfortunately, this exercise greatly reduced sample size, as 
the panel structure of our data forces us to restrict in this case the sample to firms with at least two 
surveyed individuals. Nonetheless, as illustrated in Table A.2 in appendix, we continue to find a strong 
significant total effect of taste for science on citation-weighted and novel inventive output. We also 
continue to find a strong positive effect of taste for science on co-publications, share of time spent on 
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research, and even on hours worked, while taste for salary & career correlates negatively with academic 
boundary spanning and even with hours worked. We continue to find co-publications to positively affect 
inventive performance. But we do not find support for academic boundary spanning to mediate 
substantially the impact of motives on performance. Although industrial scientists and engineers with a 
high taste for science are more likely to be engaged in academic boundary spanning, and the latter 
significantly improves their inventive performance, this is not the main story behind why taste for science 
improves inventive performance in the model when including firm fixed effects.  
4.4. Robustness Checks 
Because our measures of inventive performance rely on patents, and because not all individuals are 
patenting, one might wonder to what extent our results are driven by the selection into patenting rather 
than by variation in inventive performance. Column 1 of Table A.3 in appendix shows that taste for 
science and taste for salary & career have no significant effect on the likelihood of having at least one 
patent. As such, it is unlikely that our results only reflect a selection into patenting.  
Although we observe the share of time spent on research, this might involve both basic as well as 
applied research. Because basic research can benefit more from academic boundary spanning and is more 
likely to result in co-publications, the observed correlation between co-publications and inventive 
performance might be driven by selection into basic research projects rather than by academic boundary 
spanning itself. Although the survey does not include a direct measure for the involvement in basic 
research projects, we additionally include an imperfect control for basic research involvement: a binary 
indicator for whether their job is related to the research conducted during their doctoral studies (e.g., Stern 
2004). Our findings remain robust across all models after including this proxy for basic research (results 
not reported but available upon request) 19. 
                                                          
19 Results remain unaffected if we use an alternative proxy for the involvement in basic research: a binary indicator 
for whether a Ph.D. degree was a required qualification for their job in industry (results not reported). 
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Given the skewness of inventive performance, our results might be driven by a few very 
productive individuals with a high taste for science and a low taste for salary. As illustrated in column 2 
of Table A.3, our main results are unaffected after dropping the most productive individuals with a 
citation-weighted patent count above 75 (3% of the full sample, 13% of the patenting individuals)20.  
Because citation-weighted patents capture both the quantity and value of patents, and we are 
interested to see any differential effect on quantity versus value, we replicate the analysis using the 
number of patents and the number of citations separately in columns 3-4 and 5-6 of Table A.3 
respectively. Although results are robust to using either measure of performance, taste for science, taste 
for salary & career, and co-publications seem to have a stronger effect on citations than on number of 
patents. A one standard deviation increase in taste for science increases the number of patents with 64%, 
while it increases the number of citations with 83%. While the mediation effects through academic 
boundary spanning are significant for citations21, they are not significant in the models with number of 
patents as outcome. This latter result is consistent with Sauermann and Cohen (2010) who also did not 
find support for their self-reported measure of professional meeting attendance to mediate the impact of 
motives on the self-reported number of patents. Overall, the comparison of counts of citations versus 
counts of patents suggests that the impact of taste for science, both directly and as well as indirectly 
through academic boundary spanning, is more pronounced for the value than for the quantity of inventive 
output. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Prior research in the economics and strategy of innovation mostly overlooked that firms’ capacity to 
innovate hinges on the individual scientists and engineers who engage in R&D inside firms and on what 
                                                          
20 The most productive scientists have a taste for science equal to 0.26 and a taste for salary & career equal to -0.12 . 
21 Co-publications and time spent on research significantly mediate the positive relationship between taste for 
science and number of citations (Coefficient taste for science in column (5) versus (6): chi2(1)= 2.81; p-value of one 
sided test = 0.0468; For taste for salary & career, co-publications significantly mediate the negative relationship with 
number of citations (Coefficient taste for salary and career in column (5) versus (6): chi2(1)= 3.00; p-value of one 
sided test = 0.0416) . 
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drives these individuals to perform. By contrast, the economics of science literature underlines the 
importance of individuals’ motives, particularly non-pecuniary motives or taste for science, as a driver of 
productivity in an academic environment. In this paper, we bridge both streams of literature and illustrate 
that the taste for science of industrial scientists and engineers is strongly related not only to the quantity 
but also to the nature of their inventive output.  
We find that industrial scientist and engineers with a strong taste for science have a more novel 
and a higher value-weighted inventive output. Looking at potential explanations driving this relationship, 
we find that individuals with a taste for science do not work more hours a week. But they spend more of 
their time on research and engage more in academic boundary spanning, proxied by co-publications with 
academic scientists. Bench-level collaboration with academics is associated with a higher value-weighted 
and a more novel inventive output, and partially mediates the relation between taste for science and value 
weighted inventive output. Surprisingly, academic boundary spanning does not mediate the relation 
between taste for science and novelty of output. In addition, we find that individuals with a strong taste 
for salary & career co-publish less with academics, arguably because of the tradeoff between co-
publishing and salary, for which we also find empirical evidence in our data. Their lower inclination to 
collaborate with academic scientists results in a lower value weighted inventive output, all else equal.  
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the thin literature 
studying the relation between the motives of industrial scientists and engineers and firm innovation by 
providing insight into the mechanisms through which motives affect the inventive performance of 
individuals, particularly academic boundary spanning. We further contribute to this emerging line of 
research by studying how motives affect the nature rather than just the amount of inventive output. Not all 
patented inventions are intrinsically novel and valuable. Most new inventions only introduce an 
incremental rather than a radical change with respect to prior art and have little economic value (Scherer 
and Harhoff 2000). We illustrate to what extent and through which mechanisms motives affect not just 
the amount of inventive output but also the novelty and value of that output.  
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Second, we add to the larger literature studying how scientific research in academe translates into 
technological progress in industry (e.g., Jaffe 1989). Prior research already illustrated the importance of 
academic boundary spanning, measured by co-publications with academic scientists, for firm-level 
innovation (e.g., Cockburn and Henderson 1998). Yet, this line of research, which is mostly at the firm- 
and macro-level, has largely overlooked that higher ability individuals have a stronger incentive to 
interact with the academic community because of the higher expected returns (Stern 2004). This 
introduces an upward selection bias in estimating the effect of academic boundary spanning on firm 
innovation. We contribute to this line of research by analyzing the individual-level implications of 
crossing the boundary between industry and academia while accounting for individual ability. Studying 
individual scientists and engineers provides a more granular insight in the mechanism of how academic 
science translates into applied research and innovation in industry (Liu and Stuart 2010). As the 
knowledge from early stage research in universities is partly tacit in nature and difficult to access and 
absorb for use in industry, bench-level collaboration with academics allows industrial scientists and 
engineers to access this external knowledge and translate into commercial applications (Zucker et al. 
2002, Cassiman et al. 2012). Controlling for individual ability and job characteristics, our findings 
confirm that industrial scientists and engineers who co-publish with academic scientists have a more 
novel and higher value weighted inventive output compared to industrial scientists and engineers working 
for the same firm who do not engage in such external collaboration. Individuals with a high taste for 
science and a strong pre-sample scientific track record are most likely to engage in such boundary 
spanning.  
Our findings have implications for industrial scientists and engineers and the managers who 
recruit and manage them. First, because of the difficulties with command-and-control systems and 
provision of the right incentives to stimulate inventive performance, it is important to hire scientists and 
engineers who are intrinsically motivated. Individuals with a strong taste for science are simply more 
creative and productive, even after controlling for ability, number of hours worked, time spent on 
research, and interaction with the academic community. The fact that taste for science remains a strong 
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and significant predictor of performance is arguably because the actual intensity of cognitive effort per 
hour worked is not captured by any of our mediators (Kahneman 1973, Sauermann and Cohen 2010). 
This particularly holds for the novelty of inventive output.  
Second, our findings suggest that a firm’s policy to allow, or potentially even stimulate, its 
scientists and engineers to interact with the academic community seems to pay off in terms of higher 
inventive performance. Our results confirm and generalize prior firm-level research for the 
pharmaceutical sector illustrating how pro-publication incentives foster innovation at the firm level 
(Cockburn and Henderson 1998). Firms’ policies of paying a lower salary in return for the freedom to 
participate in the scientific community and publish is presumably counterproductive in terms of fostering 
innovation (Stern 2004). Individuals who care about salary will interact less with the academic 
community, will not absorb valuable external knowledge, and consequently develop less valuable 
inventions.  
Our study has several limitations that should be taken into account when interpreting the results. 
First, although the survey and secondary sources provide information on a range of motives and potential 
mechanisms mediating the relation between motives and performance, there might be other motives and 
mediators which are not captured in our study. In particular, the desire for peer recognition is not included 
in the survey while it is considered as a crucial motive for scientists (Merton 1973). As for the mediating 
variables, we only found partial mediation for academic boundary spanning on value weighted inventive 
output and no significant mediation on novel output. The search for other mediators that may account for 
why industrial scientists and engineers with a high “taste for science” are more successful is still on. 
Second, we remain reluctant to interpret causal relations between motives, mediators, and performance. 
Although prior research illustrates that motives related to intellectual challenge and independence are 
stable over time and not affected by changes in performance (Sauermann and Cohen 2010), we only have 
one wave of survey data so that we cannot rule out the possibility that motives changed due to 
socialization in the job or due to a change in performance. Last but not least, other dimensions of 
inventive output await further exploration. 
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TABLE 1: Rotated Factor Loadings and Unique Variances (n=1,114) 
Motives Taste for salary & career Taste for science Uniqueness 
Intellectual challenge 0.18 0.90 0.15 
Independence 0.03 0.88 0.22 
Contribution to society 0.30 0.50 0.67 
Salary 0.87 0.07 0.24 
Extralegal benefits 0.92 0.06 0.15 
Career advancement 0.59 0.25 0.60 
Job security 0.81 0.27 0.27 
Eigenvalue 3.25 1.45  
% of variance 60% 27%  
The sample includes all Ph.D. holders working as scientist or engineer in academia or industry, varimax rotation, loadings above 0.5 in bold 
TABLE 2: Summary Statistics for Industrial Scientists and Engineers (n=464) 
Variable Description Mean Stdev. Min. Max. 
Inventive performance      
Patents  Number of granted patents filed during current job 0.81 3.14 0.00 42.00 
Zero patents Binary: zero granted patents filed during current job 0.80  0.00 1.00 
Citation-weighted patents  Number of citation-weighted granted patents filed during current job 8.12 44.29 0.00 699.00 
New words  Number of words in the title, abstract, or claims, appearing for the first 
time in the USPTO patent corpus, found in the granted patents filed during 
current job 
1.58 12.94 0.00 263.00 
Motives      
Taste for science Latent variable obtained from factor analysis, standardized -0.19 0.98 -1.65 1.88 
Taste for salary & career Latent variable obtained from factor analysis, standardized -0.04 0.49 -0.45 2.68 
Potential Mediators      
Co-publications  Number of WOS publications co-authored with university scientists 
during current job 
2.02 6.52 0.00 75.00 
Zero co-publications Binary: zero WOS publications co-authored with university scientists 
during current job 
0.60  0.00 1.00 
Research  Share of time spent on research 29.75 28.06 0.00 100.00 
Hours worked Average number of hours worked per week 49.50 7.94 38.00 80.00 
Pre-sample ability controls      
Pre sample patents (citation weighted) Number of citation-weighted patents before current job 2.47 14.62 0.00 211.00 
Pre sample publications Number of WOS publications before current job 1.80 5.06 0.00 74.00 
Pre sample publication citations Average number of citations per WOS publication before current job 1.37 3.16 0.00 38.17 
Ph.D. scholarship Binary: Ph.D. funded by scholarship 0.62  0.00 1.00 
Time to Ph.D. Time to finish Ph.D. relative to peers 0.97 0.28 0.02 2.63 
Ph.D. abroad Binary: Ph.D. obtained from foreign university 0.11  0.00 1.00 
Other controls      
Job tenure Number of years in current job 9.98 7.92 1.00 37.00 
Job tenure>10 Binary: longer than 10 years in current job 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Age Age at the end of 2015 42.05 8.51 27.00 65.00 
Female  0.19  0.00 1.00 
Belgian  0.88  0.00 1.00 
Married Binary: married or officially cohabiting 0.86  0.00 1.00 
Children Number of children 1.61 1.33 0.00 6.00 
Ph.D. natural science  0.61  0.00 1.00 
Ph.D. agricultural sciences  0.03  0.00 1.00 
Ph.D. medical sciences  0.07  0.00 1.00 
Ph.D. engineering and technology  0.29  0.00 1.00 
Firm patents  Number of patents assigned to the firm from 2003-2005, log transformed 3.23 3.05 0.00 10.90 
Firm zero patents Binary: zero patents assigned to the firm from 2003-2005 0.29  0.00 1.00 
Firm co-publications  Number of WOS publications by firm employees co-authored with 
university scientists, from 2003-2005, log transformed 
1.04 1.47 0.00 5.47 
Firm zero co-publications Binary: zero WOS publications by firm employees co-authored with 
university scientists, from 2003-2005 
0.57  0.00 1.00 
Firm name missing Binary: firm name missing 0.09  0.00 1.00 
Salary Annual base salary in EURO in 2015, log transformed (n=410) 11.09 0.44 9.83 12.61 
Notes: Taste for science and taste for salary & career are calculated and normalized based on the full sample of scientists and engineers currently 
employed in industry or academe (n=1,114). Publication data sourced from Thomson Reuters Web of Science. Patent data sourced from the U.S. 
inventor patent database (Li et al., 2014). 
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TABLE 3: Summary Statistics for Subsamples of Industrial Scientists and Engineers 
(n=464) 
 Inventive performance Mediators 
 Patents Citation-weighted  
patents 
New words Co-publications Research Hours 
worked 
 Mean Binary Mean Mean Binary Mean Binary Mean Mean 
Taste for science          
Larger than median 1.37 0.22 14.71 3.18 0.17 2.52 0.43 33.37 49.10 
Smaller than median 0.51 0.19 4.52 0.70 0.12 1.75 0.39 27.77 49.72 
Taste for salary & career           
Larger than median 1.10 0.22 9.57 3.79 0.17 1.28 0.38 29.94 50.55 
Smaller than median 0.73 0.20 7.71 0.96 0.12 2.23 0.41 29.69 49.20 
Co-publications          
Larger than median 1.20 0.26 12.86 2.76 0.17 5.02 1.00 31.40 49.35 
Smaller than median 0.55 0.16 4.92 0.78 0.11 0.00 0.00 28.63 49.60 
Research          
Larger than median 0.95 0.22 9.66 2.07 0.14 2.22 0.42 46.96 49.70 
Smaller than median 0.60 0.18 5.82 0.85 0.12 1.74 0.38 4.02 49.20 
Hours worked          
Larger than median 1.13 0.24 11.60 2.28 0.17 
 
2.34 0.39 29.08 55.10 
Smaller than median 0.42 0.16 3.91 0.72 0.10 1.64 0.42 30.55 42.72 
TABLE 4: Regression of Inventive Performance on Motives  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
New  
words 
New  
words 
New  
words 
Taste for science 0.546***  0.612** 0.656***  0.718*** 
 (0.202)  (0.249) (0.201)  (0.223) 
Taste for salary & career  -1.005 -0.802*  -0.095 -0.302 
  (0.754) (0.423)  (0.535) (0.348) 
Age 0.046 0.056 0.039 -0.022 -0.012 -0.024 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.039) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) 
Age2 -0.005* -0.006* -0.005* 0.004** 0.004* 0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female -0.227 -0.179 -0.085 -0.409 -0.391 -0.285 
 (0.452) (0.473) (0.420) (0.704) (0.597) (0.585) 
Belgian  0.363 -0.000 0.137 0.610 0.406 0.539 
 (0.666) (0.521) (0.512) (0.669) (0.683) (0.649) 
Married 0.207 0.087 0.173 -1.147** -1.455** -1.098** 
 (0.546) (0.578) (0.511) (0.488) (0.588) (0.472) 
Children 0.061 0.112 0.055 -0.045 0.039 -0.055 
 (0.146) (0.151) (0.131) (0.217) (0.197) (0.206) 
Pre sample patents 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.013** 0.015** 0.012** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Pre sample publications -0.009 0.008 0.003 -0.126 -0.142 -0.112 
 (0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.129) (0.137) (0.122) 
Pre sample publication citations -0.055 -0.024 -0.043 -0.208 -0.167 -0.208 
 (0.040) (0.052) (0.046) (0.156) (0.146) (0.158) 
Ph.D. scholarship 1.021** 1.031*** 0.984** 0.290 0.557 0.256 
 (0.429) (0.392) (0.410) (0.418) (0.406) (0.418) 
Time to Ph.D. -1.637* -1.334* -1.651* -0.544 -0.399 -0.622 
 (0.889) (0.802) (0.883) (0.703) (0.693) (0.695) 
Ph.D. abroad -0.995 -1.030 -1.032 0.411 0.326 0.360 
 (0.671) (0.714) (0.679) (0.593) (0.572) (0.568) 
Firm patents 0.230** 0.236** 0.232** 0.271*** 0.238*** 0.278*** 
 (0.115) (0.101) (0.098) (0.083) (0.080) (0.084) 
Firm co-publications -0.243 -0.226 -0.216 -0.371** -0.352 -0.365* 
 (0.205) (0.189) (0.180) (0.184) (0.218) (0.187) 
Firm name missing 0.871** 0.736** 0.799** -1.763*** -2.369*** -1.739*** 
 (0.416) (0.354) (0.358) (0.481) (0.540) (0.473) 
Job tenure>10 0.148 0.206 0.318 -0.945 -0.945* -0.884 
 (0.395) (0.423) (0.402) (0.575) (0.546) (0.589) 
Constant -0.789 -0.858 -0.759 -3.091*** -2.979*** -3.102*** 
 (1.374) (1.414) (1.386) (0.960) (0.911) (0.972) 
Log likelihood -5649.884 -5741.403 -5383.628 -1220.869 -1323.293 -1212.691 
Notes: The sample include 464 industrial scientists and engineers. Models are estimated with Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood, the models are 
estimated with exposure to account for differences in job tenure, all models include Ph.D. field fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, 
clustered at firm level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 5: Regression of Co-publications, Time Spent on Research, and Hours Worked as 
Potential Mediators  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Co-publ. Co-publ. Co-publ. Research 
 
Research 
 
Research 
 
Hours  
worked 
Hours  
worked 
Hours 
worked 
Taste for science 0.311***  0.297*** 0.201***  0.201*** -0.006  -0.006 
 (0.096)  (0.106) (0.039)  (0.039) (0.007)  (0.007) 
Taste for salary & career  -0.849** -0.664**  -0.115 -0.097  -0.013 -0.014 
  (0.381) (0.279)  (0.103) (0.088)  (0.013) (0.013) 
Job tenure    0.026** 0.024** 0.027** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
    (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age -0.034* -0.035* -0.039** -0.017* -0.015* -0.018** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Female -0.116 -0.173 -0.125 0.311*** 0.268*** 0.303*** -0.036 -0.036 -0.037* 
 (0.217) (0.200) (0.206) (0.101) (0.103) (0.102) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Belgian  0.396 0.239 0.308 0.001 -0.070 -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.011 
 (0.809) (0.841) (0.821) (0.185) (0.165) (0.185) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) 
Married 0.445 0.479* 0.469* 0.090 0.101 0.097 0.045** 0.046** 0.046** 
 (0.273) (0.276) (0.269) (0.152) (0.161) (0.151) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Children 0.001 0.016 0.001 -0.008 0.001 -0.009 0.008 0.007 0.007 
 (0.101) (0.112) (0.103) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pre sample patents -0.036*** -0.018* -0.024** -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pre sample publications 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Pre sample publication citations -0.005 0.013 0.004 -0.016 -0.011 -0.016 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ph.D. scholarship 0.063 0.106 0.105 0.147 0.149 0.151 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.232) (0.234) (0.229) (0.100) (0.101) (0.100) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Time to Ph.D. 0.394 0.372 0.350 0.047 0.062 0.038 -0.019 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.385) (0.397) (0.393) (0.171) (0.169) (0.174) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Ph.D. abroad 0.149 0.136 0.144 -0.062 -0.095 -0.065 0.012 0.013 0.012 
 (0.677) (0.719) (0.711) (0.182) (0.174) (0.184) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Firm patents 0.002 0.023 0.018 -0.007 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.095) (0.092) (0.093) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Firm co-publications -0.129 -0.136 -0.123 -0.025 -0.029 -0.025 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.138) (0.136) (0.136) (0.039) (0.043) (0.040) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Firm name missing 0.104 0.097 0.112 0.060 0.016 0.056 0.013 0.014 0.013 
 (0.276) (0.260) (0.270) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Job tenure>10 -0.517 -0.439 -0.434 -0.219 -0.203 -0.216 0.063** 0.064** 0.064** 
 (0.340) (0.350) (0.351) (0.184) (0.191) (0.185) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Constant -2.184*** -2.357*** -2.339*** 2.962*** 2.983*** 2.947*** 3.895*** 3.894*** 3.893*** 
 (0.744) (0.784) (0.786) (0.308) (0.290) (0.310) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Log likelihood -1454.903 -1445.265 -1419.648 -7095.467 -7321.256 -7080.141 -1579.407 -1579.307 -1578.932 
Notes: The sample include 464 industrial scientists and engineers. Models are estimated with Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood, models (1), (2), 
and (3) are estimated with exposure to account for differences in job tenure, all models include Ph.D. field fixed effects, robust standard errors in 
brackets, clustered at firm level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 6: Mediation of Motives by Co-publications, Time Spent on Research, and Hours 
Worked 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
New  
words 
New  
words 
New  
words 
New  
words 
New  
words 
Taste for science 0.612** 0.461** 0.508** 0.595** 0.380* 0.718*** 0.634*** 0.672*** 0.721*** 0.610*** 
 (0.249) (0.215) (0.247) (0.243) (0.204) (0.223) (0.209) (0.229) (0.221) (0.217) 
Taste for salary & career -0.802* -0.388 -0.829* -0.741* -0.373 -0.302 -0.103 -0.305 -0.243 -0.065 
 (0.423) (0.361) (0.425) (0.404) (0.373) (0.348) (0.335) (0.364) (0.336) (0.337) 
Co-publications  0.034***   0.031***  0.028***   0.025*** 
  (0.007)   (0.008)  (0.008)   (0.009) 
Research   0.011*  0.007   0.006  0.003 
   (0.006)  (0.008)   (0.007)  (0.007) 
Hours worked    0.035** 0.022    0.036* 0.025 
    (0.015) (0.015)    (0.019) (0.020) 
Age 0.039 0.010 0.046 0.024 0.005 -0.024 -0.028 -0.020 -0.035 -0.034 
 (0.039) (0.029) (0.040) (0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.028) 
Age2 -0.005* -0.004 -0.005* -0.004 -0.003 0.005** 0.005** 0.004** 0.005** 0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female -0.085 -0.082 -0.191 -0.148 -0.166 -0.285 -0.344 -0.296 -0.263 -0.326 
 (0.420) (0.399) (0.483) (0.404) (0.439) (0.585) (0.591) (0.601) (0.568) (0.599) 
Belgian  0.137 -0.024 0.058 -0.055 -0.164 0.539 0.605 0.533 0.382 0.486 
 (0.512) (0.451) (0.538) (0.476) (0.456) (0.649) (0.719) (0.632) (0.598) (0.675) 
Married 0.173 -0.095 0.012 -0.038 -0.243 -1.098** -1.225*** -1.090** -1.242** -1.317*** 
 (0.511) (0.484) (0.466) (0.498) (0.477) (0.472) (0.453) (0.449) (0.494) (0.473) 
Children 0.055 -0.079 0.090 0.039 -0.063 -0.055 -0.169 -0.037 -0.073 -0.162 
 (0.131) (0.110) (0.140) (0.128) (0.125) (0.206) (0.228) (0.214) (0.195) (0.229) 
Pre sample patents 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.012** 0.012** 0.013** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Pre sample publications 0.003 -0.025 0.004 0.008 -0.017 -0.112 -0.122 -0.098 -0.086 -0.100 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.027) (0.029) (0.122) (0.132) (0.119) (0.111) (0.124) 
Pre sample publication 
citations 
-0.043 -0.061 -0.033 -0.044 -0.051 -0.208 -0.258 -0.205 -0.210 -0.251 
 (0.046) (0.058) (0.053) (0.041) (0.057) (0.158) (0.167) (0.157) (0.151) (0.158) 
Ph.D. scholarship 0.984** 1.010** 0.964** 0.921** 0.949** 0.256 0.284 0.263 0.259 0.283 
 (0.410) (0.436) (0.392) (0.384) (0.407) (0.418) (0.455) (0.425) (0.400) (0.441) 
Time to Ph.D. -1.651* -1.415 -1.514* -1.589* -1.286 -0.622 -0.352 -0.634 -0.560 -0.307 
 (0.883) (0.906) (0.773) (0.864) (0.814) (0.695) (0.631) (0.675) (0.647) (0.609) 
Ph.D. abroad -1.032 -0.855 -0.933 -1.156* -0.855 0.360 0.644 0.364 0.293 0.586 
 (0.679) (0.645) (0.703) (0.670) (0.633) (0.568) (0.525) (0.559) (0.552) (0.506) 
Firm patents 0.232** 0.109** 0.220** 0.232** 0.111* 0.278*** 0.230*** 0.268*** 0.268*** 0.219*** 
 (0.098) (0.054) (0.091) (0.090) (0.057) (0.084) (0.084) (0.078) (0.074) (0.073) 
Firm co-publications -0.216 0.001 -0.236 -0.219 -0.021 -0.365* -0.297 -0.357** -0.350** -0.282 
 (0.180) (0.132) (0.170) (0.172) (0.127) (0.187) (0.192) (0.179) (0.175) (0.181) 
Firm name missing 0.799** 0.652** 0.593* 0.788** 0.571* -1.739*** -2.000*** -1.799*** -1.934*** -2.158*** 
 (0.358) (0.309) (0.318) (0.351) (0.298) (0.473) (0.485) (0.461) (0.506) (0.547) 
Job tenure>10 0.318 0.238 0.274 0.286 0.216 -0.884 -1.062 -0.884 -0.841 -1.016 
 (0.402) (0.442) (0.424) (0.413) (0.461) (0.589) (0.649) (0.598) (0.581) (0.639) 
Constant -0.759 0.064 -1.103 -2.218 -1.164 -3.102*** -2.965*** -3.269*** -4.688*** -4.188*** 
 (1.386) (1.229) (1.345) (1.593) (1.422) (0.972) (0.930) (1.004) (1.392) (1.381) 
Log likelihood -5383.628 -4656.485 -5205.093 -5268.610 -4548.289 -1212.691 -1156.376 -1205.659 -1193.241 -1145.243 
Notes: The sample include 464 industrial scientists and engineers. Models are estimated with Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood, estimated with 
exposure to account for differences in job tenure and include Ph.D. field fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at firm level, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 7: Effects of Motives on Citation-Weighted Patents 
 
Coef. Bias. Bootstrap  std. err. 
[95% bias-corrected 
conf. interval] 
Taste for science      
Direct effect 0.3798 -0.0912 0.1968 0.0943 0.8566 
Indirect effect via co-publications 0.0093 0.0018 0.0059 0.0006 0.0204 
Indirect effect via research 0.0015 -0.0007 0.0021 -0.0030 0.0052 
Total indirect effect  0.0108 0.0011 0.0057 0.0018 0.0222 
Total effect  0.3905 -0.0901 0.1964 0.1072 0.8793 
Taste for salary & career      
Direct effect -0.3733 0.0528 0.4706 -1.8154 0.3105 
Indirect effect via co-publications -0.0208 -0.0078 0.0153 -0.0435 -0.0002 
Indirect effect via research -0.0007 0.0004 0.0015 -0.0045 0.0013 
Total indirect effect  -0.0215 -0.0073 0.0150 -0.0438 -0.0003 
Total effect  -0.3949 0.0455 0.4681 -1.8256 0.2883 
Notes: Based on non-parametric bootstrapping with 5,000 replications (with replacement). Model is estimated with generalized structured 
equation model (Poisson quasi maximum likelihood). The indirect effects are calculated by multiplying the effect of the taste on the mediator 
with the effect of the mediator on citation-weighted patents. The total indirect effects are calculated by adding the individual indirect effects. The 
total effect of the taste is calculated by adding the direct effect of the taste with the total indirect effect of the taste.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1: Salary 
 (1) 
 Salary (ln) 
  
Co-publications -0.005** 
 (0.002) 
Research -0.000 
 (0.001) 
Hours worked 0.014*** 
 (0.002) 
Job tenure 0.022*** 
 (0.005) 
Age 0.022*** 
 (0.004) 
Age2 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Female 0.048 
 (0.037) 
Belgian  0.181** 
 (0.083) 
Married 0.054 
 (0.042) 
Children 0.026* 
 (0.013) 
Pre sample patents 0.000 
 (0.001) 
Pre sample publications 0.005** 
 (0.002) 
Pre sample publication citations -0.004 
 (0.004) 
Ph.D. scholarship -0.002 
 (0.035) 
Time to Ph.D. -0.087* 
 (0.051) 
Ph.D. abroad 0.087 
 (0.072) 
Firm patents 0.008 
 (0.006) 
Firm co-publications 0.009 
 (0.012) 
Firm name missing -0.090*** 
 (0.029) 
Job tenure>10 -0.111* 
 (0.061) 
Constant 10.108*** 
 (0.158) 
R-squared 0.581 
Notes: The sample includes 410 industrial scientists and engineers. Ph.D. field fixed effects are included. Model is estimated with OLS, robust 
standard errors in brackets, clustered at firm level, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A.2: Firm Fixed Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Co-publications Research Hours  
worked 
Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
New  
words 
New  
words 
        
Taste for science 0.216*** 0.253*** 0.046* 0.611*** 0.751*** 0.790*** 1.034*** 
 (0.077) (0.094) (0.025) (0.118) (0.133) (0.156) (0.218) 
Taste for salary & career -0.671*** -0.373** -0.193*** -0.013 0.161 0.081 0.483 
 (0.142) (0.185) (0.053) (0.503) (0.466) (0.318) (0.451) 
Co-publications     0.150***  0.122*** 
     (0.050)  (0.033) 
Research     -0.005  -0.013* 
     (0.007)  (0.008) 
Hours worked     -0.002  -0.077 
     (0.034)  (0.049) 
Age -0.059*** -0.034* -0.048*** -0.023 -0.014 -0.041 -0.010 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.008) (0.036) (0.028) (0.061) (0.073) 
Age2 -0.002* 0.000 0.002*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.007* -0.010* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) 
Female -0.678*** 0.218 0.101 -0.151 0.580 -0.005 0.265 
 (0.183) (0.159) (0.084) (0.822) (0.641) (0.803) (0.512) 
Belgian  0.980** 0.386 -0.120 -0.065 0.804 2.612* 1.714 
 (0.431) (0.390) (0.174) (1.245) (1.248) (1.527) (1.176) 
Married -0.342 -0.474 0.015 1.251** 1.576*** 2.598*** 3.101*** 
 (0.231) (0.331) (0.121) (0.609) (0.440) (0.742) (0.818) 
Children 0.022 -0.050 0.017 -0.280 -0.413** -0.610** -0.691** 
 (0.065) (0.070) (0.020) (0.176) (0.183) (0.280) (0.280) 
Pre sample patents -0.035*** -0.013 -0.001 0.014* 0.020*** -0.002 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) 
Pre sample publications 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.025*** -0.164 -0.196 0.299 0.316 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.159) (0.179) (0.279) (0.210) 
Pre sample publication citations -0.026 -0.048 -0.015 -0.185 -0.138 -0.615 -0.604 
 (0.034) (0.049) (0.019) (0.283) (0.295) (0.392) (0.387) 
Ph.D. scholarship -0.131 0.093 -0.053 0.136 -0.059 -0.053 -0.442 
 (0.168) (0.161) (0.050) (0.929) (0.691) (0.670) (0.517) 
Time to Ph.D. -0.322 -0.217 -0.102 -2.690*** -2.429*** -1.703*** -1.255** 
 (0.278) (0.231) (0.137) (0.814) (0.607) (0.620) (0.581) 
Ph.D. abroad  1.087*** 0.632* 0.185 1.091 1.456 5.291** 4.561*** 
 (0.368) (0.365) (0.138) (0.985) (1.315) (2.213) (1.526) 
Job tenure>10 -0.510** -0.788*** -0.605*** 0.070 -0.211 -0.486 -0.495 
 (0.216) (0.244) (0.094) (0.837) (0.682) (0.560) (0.546) 
Number of observations 205 234 240 143 143 125 125 
Log likelihood -363.896 -3559.541 -1525.072 -1725.865 -1506.732 -203.325 -189.250 
Notes: The sample include 252 industrial scientists and engineers. Models are estimated with firm-fixed effects Poisson quasi-maximum 
likelihood, all models are estimated with exposure to account for differences in job tenure and include Ph.D. field fixed effects, robust standard 
errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE A.3: Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Patents>0 Citation- 
weighted  
patents 
Patents Patents Citations Citations 
  <=75     
Model logit pqml pqml pqml pqml pqml 
       
Taste for science 0.125 0.404*** 0.517*** 0.366*** 0.624** 0.382* 
 (0.127) (0.155) (0.166) (0.134) (0.261) (0.215) 
Taste for salary & career -0.048 -0.097 -0.625** -0.362 -0.817* -0.369 
 (0.284) (0.268) (0.313) (0.279) (0.432) (0.383) 
Co-publications 0.092* 0.036***  0.025***  0.032*** 
 (0.055) (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
Research -0.000 -0.014**  0.006  0.007 
 (0.004) (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Hours worked 0.024 -0.016  0.025*  0.021 
 (0.017) (0.025)  (0.013)  (0.016) 
Age 0.018 0.023 0.007 -0.011 0.043 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.041) (0.029) 
Age2 -0.004** -0.008*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.005* -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.365 -0.068 -0.372 -0.421 -0.055 -0.136 
 (0.345) (0.333) (0.342) (0.356) (0.434) (0.453) 
Belgian  0.316 0.110 -0.117 -0.223 0.186 -0.145 
 (0.592) (0.584) (0.429) (0.368) (0.537) (0.479) 
Married -0.062 0.895** -0.179 -0.452 0.221 -0.215 
 (0.433) (0.450) (0.487) (0.498) (0.516) (0.475) 
Children -0.117 -0.405*** 0.077 0.015 0.051 -0.074 
 (0.144) (0.097) (0.129) (0.139) (0.133) (0.126) 
Pre sample patents 0.046** 0.012** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Pre sample publications -0.073 -0.027* 0.026 0.011 -0.008 -0.030 
 (0.046) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.040) (0.040) 
Pre sample publication citations 0.048 -0.013 -0.020 -0.024 -0.046 -0.055 
 (0.053) (0.038) (0.041) (0.045) (0.049) (0.062) 
Ph.D. scholarship 0.418 0.887*** 0.494* 0.430 1.056** 1.029** 
 (0.300) (0.306) (0.294) (0.303) (0.435) (0.431) 
Time to Ph.D. -0.312 -1.118** -0.892* -0.658 -1.762* -1.383 
 (0.431) (0.548) (0.507) (0.454) (0.929) (0.865) 
Ph.D. abroad  -0.175 -1.156* -0.363 -0.254 -1.136 -0.956 
 (0.630) (0.598) (0.465) (0.407) (0.712) (0.676) 
Firm patents 0.007 0.081 0.156** 0.089* 0.242** 0.113* 
 (0.060) (0.053) (0.072) (0.047) (0.101) (0.059) 
Firm co-publications 0.030 -0.016 -0.125 -0.018 -0.228 -0.021 
 (0.106) (0.132) (0.148) (0.120) (0.184) (0.130) 
Firm name missing -0.495* 0.364 -0.064 -0.225 0.911** 0.669** 
 (0.269) (0.267) (0.256) (0.244) (0.377) (0.312) 
Job tenure>10 0.757** -0.091 0.051 -0.042 0.356 0.248 
 (0.336) (0.330) (0.333) (0.379) (0.414) (0.473) 
constant -3.232** 0.234 -2.772*** -3.807*** -0.939 -1.225 
 (1.290) (1.345) (0.891) (1.065) (1.451) (1.492) 
Log likelihood -195.813 -2062.684 -627.439 -573.685 -4898.233 -4121.614 
Notes: The sample include 464 industrial scientists and engineers. Models are estimated with Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood, all models are 
estimated with exposure to account for differences in job tenure and include Ph.D. field fixed effects, robust standard errors in brackets, clustered 
by firm, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE A.4: Correlation Table 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
(1) Patents  1.00 
                      (2) Citation-weighted patents  0.93 1.00 
                     (3) New words  0.52 0.35 1.00 
                    (4) Taste for science 0.12 0.09 0.06 1.00 
                   (5) Taste for salary & career -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 1.00 
                  (6) Co-publications  0.40 0.42 0.11 0.10 -0.09 1.00 
                 (7) Research  0.07 0.07 0.04 0.17 -0.06 0.05 1.00 
                (8) Hours worked 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.05 -0.02 1.00 
               
(9) 
Pre sample patents (citation 
weighted) 0.23 0.18 0.04 0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 1.00 
              (10) Pre sample publications -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.07 0.25 -0.01 -0.03 0.15 1.00 
             (11) Pre sample publication citations -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.36 1.00 
            (12) Ph.D. scholarship 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 1.00 
           (13) Time to Ph.D. -0.06 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.10 0.06 0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.09 1.00 
          (14) Ph.D. abroad 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.13 -0.15 1.00 
         (15) Job tenure 0.21 0.19 0.15 -0.03 0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.18 -0.07 -0.25 -0.30 0.03 0.04 -0.05 1.00 
        (16) Job tenure>10 0.20 0.18 0.11 -0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.21 -0.04 -0.24 -0.29 0.09 0.02 -0.07 0.86 1.00 
       (17) Age 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.08 0.16 0.09 -0.16 -0.31 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.74 0.65 1.00 
      (18) Female -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.14 -0.15 -0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.09 0.05 -0.19 -0.16 -0.20 1.00 
     (19) Belgian -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.06 -0.64 0.09 0.11 -0.04 -0.03 1.00 
    (20) Married 0.01 0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.10 -0.07 1.00 
   (21) Children 0.05 0.05 -0.04 0.10 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.18 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.12 -0.15 0.03 0.29 1.00 
  (22) Firm patents (log) 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.13 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.07 -0.09 0.07 0.19 0.18 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.08 1.00 
 (23) Firm co-publications (log) 0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.57 1.00 
(24) Firm name missing -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 -0.34 -0.23 
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